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THE RULE IN HODGE’S CASE:
RUMOURS OF ITS DEATH ARE GREATLY
EXAGGERATED
Benjamin L. Berger∗
Certain academic commentators and Canadian courts have announced the death
of the rule in Hodge’s Case. The author challenges this proclamation of death,
observing that Hodge’s rule is a particular manifestation of the epistemology that
informs our law of evidence. He argues not only that the rule is doctrinally intact,
but that the principles and spirit that animate Hodge’s rule have broad influence
in our law of evidence and have utility in the appellate review of unreasonable
verdicts. Hodge’s rule, Hodge-like reasoning, and the associated epistemology,
are alive and well in Canada.

Certains commentateurs et commentatrices universitaires et certains tribunaux
canadiens ont annoncé la mort de la règle de la cause Hodges. L’auteur conteste
cette affirmation, faisant valoir que la règle de Hodge est une manifestation
spécifique de l’épistémologie qui éclaire la loi de la preuve. Non seulement la
doctrine de la règle reste-t-elle intacte, mais les principes et l’esprit qui animent
la règle de Hodge exercent une large influence sur notre droit de la preuve et
servent à l’examen de verdicts déraisonnables. La règle de Hodge, les
raisonnements de même type, et l’épistémologie qui y est associée, sont bien
vivantes au Canada.

When continental scholars set about the work of creating the Roman-canon
law of evidence, they had two principal indigenous sources of inspiration
available to them. The first was the Ciceronian school of classical rhetoric,
which “tended to associate proof with proper argument.”1 Although this
way of conceiving of proof might have found fertile soil in an adversarial
system, it could not on its own take root in Roman-canon procedure, where
judges themselves actively engaged in the search for truth. Instead, it was
the second source for thinking about facts and proof, Aristotelian
epistemology, with its emphasis on and privileging of sensory perception,
that most influenced the scholars.2 Thus inspired, in the twelfth to
∗ Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. I wish to thank Donald
Casswell, Mirjan Damaška, Stephen Duke and David Tanovich for their comments. I also
acknowledge the financial support of the Canada-US Fulbright Program and the Law
Foundation of British Columbia Graduate Fellowship.
1 M. Damaška, “Hearsay in Cinquecento Italy,” c. 4 in Studi in Onore di Vittorio
Denti, Vol. 1 (Padova: Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, 1994) at 62.
2 Ibid.
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fourteenth centuries, church scholars constructed a complex hierarchy of
forms of proof grounded in a notion of “truth as revealed by the senses,” a
hierarchy that formed the basis for the law of evidence in the ancien
régime.3
What were the general contours of this system that would rule the
continental law of evidence until the late eighteenth century? Damaška
describes them as follows:
Among sources of cognition, the pride of place went to the fact-finder’s direct sensory
experience: in possession of immediately perceived sense data, the judge needed no
proof (in the rhetorical sense of the term). Inferential aspects of cognition were, of
course, still unknown. Most of the time, however, the judges had to rely on information
conveyed by «intermediaries» (i.e., witnesses) who inserted themselves between his
sensory apparatus and the facts of the case. In order to qualify as means of proof, these
intermediaries were required to convey sensory perceptions of facts to be proven....At
the bottom of this hierarchy was evidence consisting merely of inferences from
observed to unobserved facts, evidentiary material, that is, devoid of sensory
perceptions (indicia, argumenta, or praesumptiones).4

This system would not, however, survive the Enlightenment and the
revolutionary zeal of the late eighteenth century. Enlightenment
philosophers questioned the notion that one could, in the abstract,
determine the value of particular modes of proof. Proof, in their view,
took its meaning from experience. Accordingly, a priori hierarchies of
proof no longer made sense: “[I]f one takes the view that the probative
effect of evidence depends on the infinite particularity of experience,
then rules resting on ex ante negative judgment of probative value easily
appear as potentially dangerous overgeneralizations.”5 Revolutionary
politicians seized upon this critique and blamed the defects of ancien
régime justice upon a flawed form of evidentiary reasoning. The result of
the fusion of these philosophical and political attacks was that “the very
idea of legally controlling proof became both intellectually discredited
and politically suspect.”6 Thus, in the late eighteenth century, the
Roman-canon scheme was rejected in favour of the principle of freeevaluation of evidence “soon to be glorified on the Continent as the
cornerstone of enlightened administration of justice.”7 Evidentiary rules
founded on the primacy of sensory-experience were wiped away in
favour of a principle freeing the fact finder from rules about how to
assess evidence: “[T]he principle was espoused that the law should
3

Ibid.
Ibid. at 62-63.
5 M. Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) at 21.
6 Ibid. at 20-21.
7 Ibid. at 21.
4
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refrain from regulating the probative effect of evidence, or the necessary
quantum and quality of proof. The validity of proof was to be left to the
legally unconstrained judgment of the trier of fact – to his conviction
intime.”8
At approximately the same time that this revolution in continental
evidence law took place, a coherent law of evidence crystallized for the
first time across the channel.9 As late as the seventeenth century, English
law placed little constraint on the evidence that a jury could hear.10 It might
be said that, until the eighteenth century, the English jury was left to its
conviction intime. It was not until lawyers began to play an active role in
the English criminal trial that rules of evidence began to develop11 and
“evidentiary doctrine evolved (partly) in the desire to influence decisionmaking by occasional, amateur triers of fact.”12 Thus, once it began to
regulate proof, the law of evidence aspired to control, a priori, the analysis
of evidence,13 and one of the guiding principles adopted by common law
evidence was the relative valuation of direct sensory experience over other
forms of proof.14 In that way, the crystallization of the common law of
evidence at the end of the eighteenth century tracked the continental
revolution, but in reverse. Just as the Continent was rejecting constrictive
rules of evidence, similar rules were embraced by the common law.
In this article, I will trace the life of a common law rule of evidence
centrally concerned with the distinction between circumstantial and direct
evidence. As it is conventionally understood in the common law tradition,
the fundamental distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is
that, whereas direct evidence only demands an assessment of credibility,
8 M. Damaška, “Free Proof and its Detractors” (1995) 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 343 at 344.
9 See J. Langbein, “Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the
Ryder Sources” (1996) 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1168, in which Professor Langbein shows that,
contrary to Wigmore’s view that the law of evidence appeared in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the law of evidence was not palpable in England until the mideighteenth century and did not coalesce until the late eighteenth or early nineteenth
century. See also J. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003). For a concise overview of some aspects of the historical
development of the common law of evidence, see S. Hill et al., McWilliams’ Canadian
Criminal Evidence, 4th ed., looseleaf (Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book, 2004) at 1-3
to 1-9.
10 Beattie notes that “[i]n the seventeenth century there were few controls over the
evidence that a criminal jury could hear.” J. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England
1660-1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) at 363.
11 See Beattie, ibid. at 362-76 and Langbein (2003), supra note 9.
12 Damaška, supra note 8 at 346.
13 See Damaška, ibid. (“Common law was thus never averse to legal instruments
specifically designed to affect the analysis of evidence.”)
14 See, for example, how the description of the system of evidence in the ancien
régime given by Damaška, (supra note 4) resonates with our current evidentiary system.
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circumstantial evidence calls upon the fact finder to draw an inference
from accepted facts. That is, direct evidence requires only one
determination – whether the evidence is to be believed. Circumstantial
evidence, in contrast, adds a second question – even if believed, what
conclusions can be drawn from the evidence? Circumstantial evidence
demands a layer of inferential reasoning. Where, for example,
circumstantial evidence is proffered by the Crown in a criminal case, the
prosecution will ask the fact finder to infer the guilt of the accused,
whereas the defence will seize upon this moment of inference to argue that
the evidence does not point inexorably towards guilt.
The rule was established in Hodge’s Case.15 Before convicting an
accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the jury must be satisfied
not only that the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, but is
inconsistent with any other rational inference. This “rule” has led a varied
life. It was rejected in the United States in 195416 and discarded by the
English in 1973.17 Although wholeheartedly embraced in Canada in
1938,18 it was increasingly marginalized until, after the Supreme Court of
Canada’s 1978 decision in R. v. Cooper,19 secondary literature declared it
dead.20
I am concerned with understanding one important element in the
continued Canadian common law adherence to a conception of proof that
favours sensory perception and controls fact-finding, rather than one that
allows for the free evaluation of evidence. As the historical sketch with
which I began this article makes clear, Canadian rules of evidence disclose
underlying understandings of the nature of fact and fact-finding – a
foundational epistemology. Viewed in this light, the declaration that
Hodge’s rule is dead is of great significance. The rule is deeply immersed
in the prioritization of sensory perception over free evaluation of evidence.
Therefore, when commentators declare that R. v. Cooper “removed any
relevance of the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence,”
the claim is a profound one and must be carefully scrutinized.21 If Hodge’s
rule is dead, and the distinction between inferential modes of fact-finding
and direct sensory perception is diminished or dissolved, Canadian
evidence law has undergone a silent but significant change. I am therefore
15

Hodge’s Case (1838), 2 Lewin 227, 168 E.R. 1136.
Holland v. United States, 348 US 121 (1954).
17 McGreevy v. D.P.P., [1973] 1 All E.R. 503 (H.L.).
18 The King v. Comba, [1938] S.C.R. 396.
19 [1978] 1 S.C.R. 860.
20 See, e.g., R. Delisle, “Annotation” (1998), 17 C.R. (5th) 221 at 222 (Annotation to
R. v. Khan) and D. Watt, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Evidence, 2003 ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 2002) at 46.
21 J. Sopinka et al., The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,
1999) at 43.
16
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not only concerned with the doctrinal question of the status of the rule in
Hodge’s Case, but with the more foundational question of whether the
story of Hodge’s Case marks an erosion in the (Canadian) common law’s
a priori evaluation of the quality of certain classes of proof.
In the first section, I will examine the rule in Hodge’s Case in more
detail and consider arguments that have been made against its continued
application. I conclude that the jurisprudence still assigns Hodge’s rule an
important role and that arguments against its use are ill-founded. In my
second section, I will show that not only is the rule in Hodge’s Case quite
alive, but that Hodge-like reasoning predicated on limiting inferential factfinding is abundant in Canadian law. Hodge-like reasoning has found its
way from the jury charge into substantive doctrines of evidence left for the
determination of the trial judge. Further, I will argue that the most active
and relevant application of Hodge’s rule has become appellate review of
the reasonableness of convictions. In short, both the rule in Hodge’s Case
and its underlying spirit are alive and well in Canada, as is our basic
commitment to Aristotelian understandings of proof.
Hodge’s Rule: Its Early Life and Times
At the Liverpool Assizes in 1838, a jury heard a case against a man accused
of robbing and murdering a woman who was returning home from market.
The report of the trial, Hodge’s Case, tells us that all of the evidence
adduced against the prisoner was circumstantial:
The prisoner was well acquainted with her, and had been seen near the spot (a lane), in
or near which the murder was committed, very shortly before. There were also four
other persons together in the same lane about the same period of time. The prisoner, also,
was seen some hours after, and on the same day, but at a distance of some miles from
the spot in question, burying something, which on the following day was taken up, and
turned out to be money, and which corresponded generally as to amount with that which
the murdered woman was supposed to have had in her possession when she set out on
her return home from market, and of which she had been robbed.22

Baron Alderson told the jury that because the case was made up entirely of
circumstantial evidence, before they could find the accused guilty, they
would have to be satisfied “not only that those circumstances were
consistent with his having committed the act, but they must also be
satisfied that the facts were such as to be inconsistent with any other
rational conclusion than that the prisoner was the guilty person.”23 He then
pointed to “the proneness of the human mind to look for – and often
22
23

Supra note 15 at 227-28, 1136-37.
Ibid. at 228, 1137.
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slightly to distort the facts in order to establish such a proposition –
forgetting that a single circumstance which is inconsistent with such a
conclusion, is of more importance than all the rest, inasmuch as it destroys
the hypothesis of guilt.”24 The jury acquitted the accused.
The core of this reported charge to the jury was that, before convicting
on circumstantial evidence, the jury would have to satisfy itself that the
only rational inference to be drawn from the evidence was the guilt of the
accused. Why would Baron Alderson craft such a particular charge? What
is it about circumstantial evidence that would demand this kind of
attention? The answer comes in the latter portion of the report, where it is
said that the Baron pointed out to the jury the natural human inclination to
distort circumstantial facts to fit a particular narrative. In the intervening
years, Baron Alderson’s instincts on this issue have been confirmed by
social science evidence.25 Schum and Martin have shown that “individuals
asked to mentally aggregate a large collection of evidence may ignore,
discard, or integrate over contradictory evidence and otherwise overlook
other subtleties in evidence.”26 They characterize the core of their findings
in the following way:
Perhaps the most striking results of our study concern the manner in which our research
subjects assessed the value of contradictory and of redundant testimony. Quite startling
is the frequently observed holistic tendency to make contradictory testimony either
probatively valueless or, what seems worse, corroborative; such behaviour, however, is
certainly not unheard-of in more abstract studies of human inference. Our studies show
the existence of local as well as global “primacy” effects in which, apparently, the mind
resists changes in the direction of opinion revisions.27

Baron Alderson was entirely correct when he spoke of “the proneness of
the human mind to look for – and often slightly to distort the facts in order
to establish” a proposition of guilt. This psychological understanding has
been confirmed by social scientific work that adopts a “story” model of
decision-making, asserting that juries decide cases based on a process of
selecting the best-fit narrative.28 Of course, guilt in a criminal trial ought
not to be founded upon the “best” story, but upon guilt being the only
24

Ibid.
D. Schum & A. Martin, “Formal and Empirical Research on Cascaded Inference
in Jurisprudence,” c. 6 in R. Hastie, ed., Inside the Juror: The Psychology of Juror
Decision-Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
26 Ibid. at 168.
27 Ibid.
28 N. Pennington & R. Hastie, “The Story Model for Juror Decision Making,” c. 8 in
R. Hastie, supra note 25. Pennington and Hastie point to studies supporting the view that
decision making works largely on the basis of narratives. See W. Bennett & M. Feldman,
Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American Culture
25
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reasonable story. Further, Moore shows that “schemas,” defined as
categories in the mind that contain information about a particular subject,
predispose jurors to draw particular inferences where such inferences are
necessary.29
The rule in Hodge’s Case therefore addresses a particular apprehended
danger latent in circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence involves only one
evaluation on the part of the fact finder – a determination of whether or not
the witness offering direct sensory experience of a crime having been
committed is to be believed.30 In this decision, there is only one
opportunity for error on the part of the fact finder. The danger with
circumstantial evidence is that there are two potential points of error. The
jury must not only decide whether to believe the truth of the evidence
proffered, but to imagine or infer what this evidence might mean. This
moment of inference, it is thought, is a dangerous one that must be
controlled.
If, for example, a witness testifies that he saw the accused point a gun
at the victim and fire a shot into his body, the jury need only ask itself
whether this evidence is reliable. If the witness can only testify that he saw
the accused running from the scene of the murder with a smoking gun in
his hand, the jury must not only assess the credibility of the witness, but
must ask what this evidence suggests. It would be natural to infer that the
accused was the murderer. An equally rational inference, however, is that
the accused was merely a bystander who came across the victim and the
smoking gun, picked up the latter and ran for help. Baron Alderson’s
charge to the jury in Hodge’s Case responds to the danger that a jury would
select the first inference without considering the second. The rule in
Hodge’s Case is, therefore, a kind of prophylactic attempt to prevent the
jury from too readily inferring the guilt of the accused. It does so by
imposing a process of reasoning that would require each juror to test his or
her inferences.
One can readily see the extent to which Hodge’s rule, and with it the
very distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence, is steeped in
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1981); J. Holstein, “Jurors’ Interpretations
and Jury Decision Making” (1985) 9 Law & Hum. Behav. 83; G. Lopez, “Lay Lawyering”
(1984) 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1.
29 A. Moore, “Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom” (1989) 37 UCLA
L. Rev. 273 at 279. Moore states (at 280): “In addition to allowing us to make meaning of
a stimulus configuration and decide what to attend to next, schemas also allow us to draw
inferences, based on our schematic hypotheses, about what is likely to happen in the future
and what has happened in the past.”
30 Of course, direct (or “testimonial”) evidence might not be worthy of belief for a
variety of reasons. Misperception, errors in memory, failures in communication, or
fabrication are all sources of potential inaccuracy in testimonial evidence.
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the priorization of sensory experience. The gravamen of the jury
instruction is that a juror should be particularly cautious when asked to
convict not on the basis of what a person has seen, but on a “mere”
inference drawn from secondary observations. In what follows, it is
essential to bear this purpose in mind.
Challenges to the Rule’s Existence
The “rule” in Hodge’s Case is amenable to a spectrum of interpretations.
At one end of the spectrum the rule can be understood as imposing a legal
obligation to charge the jury in precisely the terms set out by Baron
Alderson in Hodge’s Case whenever the guilt of an accused turns on
circumstantial evidence. At the other end, the “rule” in Hodge’s Case can
be seen as actually no rule at all. Rather, it simply exemplifies the
requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt and imposes no
obligations on the trial judge with respect to jury instructions. By tracing
the development of the jurisprudence on Hodge’s Case in Canada, one can
expose two fictions. The first is that Canadian law once imposed a strict
obligation to follow precisely the words of Baron Alderson’s charge. The
second fiction, accepted in an influential evidence treatise in Canada31 and,
more recently, by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Fleet,32 is that the
rule no longer imposes special obligations on trial judges.
In 1933, in McLean v. The King, the Supreme Court embraced the rule
in Hodge’s Case.33 Five years later, in Comba, the rule was said to be a
“long settled rule of the common law.”34 In McLean, the court described
the rule in the following terms: “It is of last importance, we do not doubt,
where the evidence adduced by the Crown is solely or mainly of what is
commonly described as circumstantial, that the jury should be brought to
realize that they ought not to find a verdict against the accused unless
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused is the
only reasonable explanation of the facts established by the evidence.”35
Thus, at this point it was clear that the Supreme Court of Canada viewed
the rule in Hodge’s Case as imposing legal duties on the trial judge.
Hodge’s Case stood for the proposition that, when faced with a case
consisting of circumstantial evidence, the judge was required to instruct
the jury not to convict if the circumstantial evidence could support
31

See Sopinka et al., supra note 21.
[1997] 120 C.C.C. (3d) 457 (Ont. C.A.). See also, R. v. Tombran (1999), 142
C.C.C. (3d) 380 at 389-92 (Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Guiboche (2004), 183 C.C.C. (3d) 361
(Man. C.A.).
33 [1933] S.C.R. 688.
34 Supra note 18 at 397. Comba is frequently, though mistakenly, cited as the case in
which Hodge’s rule was adopted into Canadian law.
35 Supra note 33 at 690.
32
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reasonable explanations inconsistent with the guilt of the accused. Yet it
was also clear from the outset that the court was not imposing a formulaic
requirement upon trial judges to follow the precise words uttered by Baron
Alderson. Rather, the court made clear that “there is no single exclusive
formula which it is the duty of the trial judge to employ.”36
Almost twenty years later, in Lizotte v. The King, Justice Cartwright
resolved an ambiguity in the rule as enunciated in McLean and Comba.37
Whereas McLean spoke of a case in which the evidence adduced by the
Crown was “solely or mainly” circumstantial, Comba focussed on
situations where “the verdict rests solely upon a basis of circumstantial
evidence.”38 Did that mean that, so long as any point necessary to the
determination of the guilt of the accused rested on circumstantial
evidence, the charge was required? In Lizotte, Justice Cartwright held
that it did. Noting that it had been argued before the court that the
direction in Hodge’s Case was only required where there was no direct
evidence adduced by the Crown at all, Justice Cartwright stated that “it
is my opinion that where the proof of any essential ingredient of the
offence charged depends upon circumstantial evidence it is necessary
that the direction be given.”39 At this point in the jurisprudence, then, the
rule in Hodge’s Case had a robust mandatory (though not formulaic)
nature. Further, there was little doubt that it had a legal existence quite
distinct from any other rule of evidence.
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court decided Holland v. U.S.40
The court considered the defendant’s position that the judge was required
to instruct the jury that “where the Government’s evidence is
circumstantial it must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis
other than that of guilt.”41 Although it did not explicitly refer to the rule in
Hodge’s Case, the court rejected the submission (which amounted to a
Hodge-like charge), concluding that “the better rule is that where the jury
is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an
additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and
incorrect.”42 With Holland, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the first attack
in the common law world on the need for the rule in Hodge’s Case. How
would the Supreme Court of Canada respond? Its rejection of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s position could not have been more clear. One year later,
36

Ibid. The court nevertheless stated (ibid.) that “he would be well advised to adopt
the language of Baron Alderson or its equivalent.”
37 [1951] S.C.R. 115.
38 Supra note 18 at 397 [emphasis added].
39 Supra note 37 at 133 [emphasis added].
40 Supra note 16.
41 Ibid. at 139.
42 Ibid. at 139-140. This reasoning was recently confirmed in Desert Palace v. Costa,
123 S. Ct. 2148 at 2154 (2003).
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in Boucher v. The Queen, the court was faced with two distinct grounds of
appeal: a misdirection on reasonable doubt and a misdirection on Hodge’s
rule.43 The court concluded that the charge on reasonable doubt was
adequate, but that the instructions regarding Hodge’s rule were flawed. As
if, given the opposite rulings on two distinct legal points, there could be
any question that reasonable doubt and the rule in Hodge’s Case were
discrete doctrines, Justice Cartwright took pains to note that “the rule in
Hodge’s Case is quite distinct from the rule requiring a direction on the
question of reasonable doubt.”44
Ambiguity in the jurisprudence began to set in with the 1964 case of
R. v. Mitchell.45 The Supreme Court was faced with the argument that, with
very limited exceptions,46 determining whether an accused possessed the
requisite mens rea is always dependent upon circumstantial evidence and
therefore the instruction in Hodge’s Case is always necessary. Justice
Spence, for the majority, agreed that this would extend the rule too far and
looked back to Hodge’s Case to find some means of limitation. He
concluded, accurately, that Hodge’s Case was a case in which the
circumstantial evidence went to the identification of the accused, not his
mental state. Justice Spence reasoned that:
By its own terms…the rule is concerned with evidence as to the commission of an act.
In my opinion, that limitation is a proper one. A criminal charge is laid as a result of the
commission of a certain act or certain acts. If the evidence against the accused is
circumstantial in character, then a jury should only find him guilty in respect of those
acts if consistent with his having committed them and inconsistent with any other
rational conclusion than that he did.47

Justice Cartwright dissented on this point and would have maintained the
position that he and the rest of the court established in Lizotte – that
Hodge’s Case should be applied to all elements of the offence.
Mitchell sounded a note that resonated to some extent with Holland
and anticipated much of the debate to come. In setting the limitation on the
rule in Hodge’s Case at the boundary between mens rea and actus reus,
Justice Spence stated that “[t]he direction in Hodge’s case did not add to or
subtract from the requirement that proof of guilt in a criminal case must be
beyond a reasonable doubt.”48 Similarly, Justice Cartwright held that the
43

[1955] S.C.R. 16.
Ibid. at 30. That view has been expressed in other Canadian appellate courts. See
R. v. Ducsharm, [1955] O.R. 824 at 832-33 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Manderville, [1958] 124
C.C.C. 268 at 273 (N.B.C.A.).
45 [1964] S.C.R. 471.
46 For example, cases in which there is a confession by the accused.
47 Mitchell, supra note 45 at 478.
48 Ibid. at 479.
44
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rule in Hodge’s Case was simply “a corollary of the rule that the jury must
not convict unless they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt
of the accused.”49Accordingly, although Hodge’s rule was now limited to
circumstantial evidence bearing upon the actus reus of a crime and was no
doubt still being treated as a rule of law quite distinct from the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Canadian Supreme Court had, for
the first time, closely linked the two concepts. The link was strengthened
when, in R. v. John, Justice Ritchie held that “the language used in Hodge’s
case does nothing more than provide a graphic illustration of the principle
that where the evidence is purely circumstantial it must be made plain to
the jury that in order to be satisfied of the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt, they must first be satisfied that the circumstances are
such as to be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion than that the
accused was the guilty person.”50 Yet, if one looks back to the language
used in McLean, the essence of the direction is almost identical. Nothing
much seems to have changed and, indeed, none of McLean, Comba,
Boucher, or Lizotte were overruled.
Nevertheless, when the court pronounced its decision in R. v.
Cooper,51 Justice Laskin, in dissent, pointed to Mitchell and John, and the
recent House of Lords decision of McGreevy v. D.P.P.,52 as evidence of a
retreat from the rule in Hodge’s Case, and that the rule was now a mere
redundancy that could be replaced by a correct charge on reasonable doubt.
Justice Laskin reasoned as follows:
The judgment of the House of Lords in McGreevy v. Director of Public Prosecutions
rejects the notion that there ever was any rule arising from Hodge’s case which judges
in England were required to follow where all or most of the evidence in a jury trial was
circumstantial. In Comba v. The King, this Court referred to the formula in Hodge’s case
as “the long settled rule of the common law which is the rule of law in Canada” (at p.
397). Notwithstanding this pronouncement, this Court attenuated the rule in its
judgment in The Queen v. Mitchell, supra, and manifested its discomfort with Hodge’s
case in Alec John v. The Queen. The time has come to reject the formula in Hodge’s case
as an inexorable rule of law in Canada. Without being dogmatic against any use of the

49

Ibid. at 483.
[1971] S.C.R. 781 at 791-92.
51 Supra note 19.
52 Supra note 17. In McGreevy, the House of Lords held (at 511) that applying the
rule in Hodge’s Case “would…not only be unnecessary but would be undesirable.” The
court completely conflated the rule in Hodge’s Case with the doctrine of reasonable doubt,
stating (at 510): “It requires no more than ordinary common sense for a jury to understand
that if one suggested inference from an accepted piece of evidence leads to a conclusion
of guilt and another suggested inference to a conclusion of innocence a jury could not on
that piece of evidence alone be satisfied of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt unless they
wholly rejected and excluded the latter suggestion.”
50
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formula of the charge in Hodge’s case I would leave the matter to the good sense of the
trial judge (as was said in McGreevy), with the reminder that a charge in terms of the
traditional formula of required proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the safest as well as
the simplest way to bring a lay jury to the appreciation of the burden of proof resting on
the Crown in a criminal case.53

Reading this passage, Hodge’s rule seems to have shifted from a
mandatory rule of jury instruction to a mere descriptive principle. The
passage is the authority offered when Sopinka, Lederman, and Bryant state
that Cooper dispensed with Hodge’s rule and denied any legal significance
between circumstantial and direct evidence.54 It is also relied upon by
Delisle when he states that the rule received its death knell in Cooper.55 It
is this passage that sends the signal to modern trial courts that the rule in
Hodge’s Case is dead.
Justice Laskin was in dissent in Cooper. However, Justice Ritchie, for
the majority, stated that “[i]n this regard it will be seen that I agree with the
Chief Justice in his rejection of the Hodge formula as an inexorable rule of
law in Canada.”56 But in what “regard” is he agreeing with Justice Laskin?
Careful attention to his reasoning is required to discern the ratio of this case
and, with it, the present state of the rule in Hodge’s Case in Canada. Justice
Ritchie referred to the limitation imposed on Hodge’s rule in Mitchell and
stated that this limitation “must, I think, be taken to have been accepted as
confining the application of the Hodge’s case formula in the manner there
stated.”57 Recall that the limitation imposed in Mitchell was that the rule
in Hodge’s Case ought to apply only to proof of the actus reus. Justice
Ritchie merely confirmed the limitation. He went on to state:
This is not to say that, even where the issue is one of identification, the exact words used
by Baron Alderson must necessarily be incorporated in a judge’s charge. It is enough if
it is made plain to the members of the jury that before basing a verdict of guilty on
circumstantial evidence they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt
of the accused is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the proven facts. In this
regard it will be seen that I agree with the Chief Justice in his rejection of the Hodge
formula as an inexorable rule of law in Canada.58
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Supra note 19 at 865-66 [emphasis added].
Supra note 21.
55 Supra note 20. See also D. Tanovich, “Upping the Ante in Directed Verdict Cases
Where the Evidence is Circumstantial” (1998) 15 C.R. (5th) 21 at 27 (identifying Cooper
as the case “wherein it was held that the formula used in Hodge’s Case was not
mandatory”).
56 Supra note 19 at 881.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
54
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The majority in Cooper agreed with Justice Laskin that there is no
particular incantation that must be recited. But that was not controversial.
In McLean, the Supreme Court had already accepted that Baron Alderson’s
exact words need not be employed.59 In Cooper, then, the court merely
confirms the notion that, when proof of an element of the actus reus or
identification is dependant upon circumstantial evidence, the judge is
under a legal obligation to instruct the jury that they must not only be
satisfied that the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, but
that it is inconsistent with other reasonable inferences.60 The courts in
Fleet and Tombran and the commentators who declare the dissolution of
the legal distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence are, with
respect, mistaken.61 The rule in Hodge’s Case is not dead.
Justifications for the Rule’s Continued Existence
In light of the Canadian jurisprudential history of the rule in Hodge’s Case,
I have concluded that the rule is still alive in the Canadian law of criminal
evidence. However, the foregoing shows that the primary attack on the rule
has been a trend of assimilating the rule in Hodge’s Case to the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The argument, advanced
in both McGreevy and Holland and found in Justice Lamer’s dissent in
Cooper,62 is that the jury instruction from Hodge’s Case adds nothing to a
good charge on reasonable doubt and, much worse, might confuse the
jury.63 This attack on the rule is profound. If nothing is added by the
charge, then not only is Canadian adherence to the rule an ill-conceived
59

See text at note 36 supra.

60 In an obiter statement in R. v. Mezzo, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 802 at 843, Justice McIntyre

stated that Cooper “placed the rule in Hodge’s Case into the general consideration of
reasonable doubt.” This statement is ambiguous. It is clear in Cooper, supra note 19 at
881, that Justice Ritchie did not conflate the charge on reasonable doubt and the charge
arising from Hodge’s Case. It is true that he spoke of satisfaction beyond a reasonable
doubt, but importantly, in terms of satisfaction “beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt
of the accused is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the proven facts.”
61 Supra note 32.
62 This form of argument has also been adopted by the Ontario and Manitoba Courts
of Appeal. See Tombran and Guiboche, supra note 32.
63 Reference to the rule in Hodge’s Case appears frequently in the post-Lifchus/Starr
jurisprudence on the requirements for charging a jury regarding proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. For example in R. v. Rhee, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 364 at 382, Justice Arbour held that the
trial judge’s instruction that “you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that where
it is relied upon to support a guilty verdict the guilt of the accused is the only reasonable
inference to be drawn from the facts as you have found them to be” helped to save a charge
that did not fully comply with the Lifchus guidelines. Such cases suggest a view that
Hodge’s rule and the requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt are simply
cognates.
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historical vestige, but the distinction between circumstantial and direct
evidence is less sharp than we might otherwise assume. The question must,
therefore, be answered: does the rule in Hodge’s Case add anything to the
charge on reasonable doubt? In my view, the contention that the charge
arising from Hodge’s Case can be entirely displaced by an accurate charge
on reasonable doubt is mistaken. The argument can be rebutted on three
levels: the purposive, the functional, and the practical.
Consider first the differences in purpose between the charge on
reasonable doubt and the charge in Hodge’s Case. The charge on
reasonable doubt is meant to explain to the jury the ultimate burden of
proof which rests with the Crown, and by that means to convey the
fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence. As the Supreme
Court of Canada stated in its watershed case on reasonable doubt
charges, R. v. Lifchus, “the onus resting upon the Crown to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt is inextricably linked to
the presumption of innocence.”64 Accordingly, the purpose of the charge
on reasonable doubt is to impart the importance of the presumption of
innocence and to describe to the jury the ultimate state of mind
consistent with that essential presumption. In contrast, the purpose of the
rule in Hodge’s Case is to alert the jury to the dangers associated with a
particular kind of evidence. It rests on the assumption that the inferential
process essential to evaluating circumstantial evidence (but absent with
direct evidence) is a process that carries with it particular dangers and
therefore demands the special attention of the jury. This assumption,
clearly made by Baron Alderson, is not a vestige of naïve early
nineteenth century thinking. Rather, as I have noted above, social science
evidence has confirmed that inferential reasoning is fraught with
prejudices and presuppositions,65 and that, when left to a global
evaluation of the evidence, jurors will distort and ignore evidence so as
to have it conform with a “best-fit” story or narrative understanding of
the case.66 Whereas one charge is concerned with conveying the ultimate
burden of proof premised on the presumption of innocence, the other
addresses the difficulties latent in particular kinds of evidence. I would
suggest that with such disparate purposes, the assimilation of the two
charges is conceptually unacceptable.
Next, though not entirely unrelated to the purposes of the charges,
consider the functional differences between the charge on reasonable
doubt and the rule in Hodge’s Case. The charge explaining
reasonable doubt describes a state of mind. The charge in Hodge’s
Case charts out a path of reasoning specific to particular evidence.
64

[1997] 3 S.C.R. 320 at 326.
See Moore, supra note 29.
66 See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 28.
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In Lifchus, the court provided a suggested charge on reasonable
doubt.67 When one looks at the charge, it is apparent that although it amply
describes the state of mind called “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt,” it
does not give the jury any guidance about how this state of mind is to be
achieved when faced with inferential reasoning. The jurors are told that a
reasonable doubt is based on reason and common sense, is not “frivolous”
or “imaginary” and involves being “sure” of the accused’s guilt. Although
a highly sophisticated juror might apply this description to the inferential
aspect of circumstantial evidence and generate a rule like that in Hodge’s
Case,68 I would argue that this is beside the point – the functional
difference between the judicial charges remains. One describes a state of
mind, while the other lays out a process of reasoning. To suggest that the
second is unnecessary because it is logically implicit in the first is
analogous to saying that a sufficient description of the address and
surroundings of your home dispenses with any need to give a guest
directions.
Finally, there are two practical imperatives that reinforce a meaningful
distinction between the two charges. The first derives from the social
science evidence cited above. Recall that Shum and Martin show that
“individuals asked to mentally aggregate a large collection of evidence
may ignore, discard, or integrate over contradictory evidence and
otherwise overlook other subtleties in evidence.”69 At the same time, they
recognize that “attentive factfinders with reasonable intellectual skills can
incorporate the many subtleties in evidence if, at least, they are alerted to
the existence of these subtleties.”70 I would argue that Hodge’s rule is a
practical judicial means of achieving that result.
The other practical imperative for specifically alerting the jury to the
problems associated with the inferential reasoning inherent in
circumstantial evidence is the Canadian experience of wrongful
convictions. The concern for protecting against wrongful convictions has
placed the Canadian law of evidence under close scrutiny. A number of
commissions have pointed to evidentiary failures (including inadequate
disclosure, the unreliability of jailhouse informants and problems with
expert evidence, identification procedures and the use of demeanour
evidence) as factors in wrongful convictions.71 A theme running through
the report into the wrongful murder conviction of Guy Paul Morin is the
unique set of dangers associated with circumstantially-based cases.72 With
67
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Supra note 65 at 336-37.
This is, fundamentally, the picture painted by the court in McGreevy, supra note

17.
69

Supra note 25 at 168.
Ibid. [emphasis added].
71 See Hill, supra note 9 at 3-18 to 3-21.
72 F. Kaufman, Commissioner, The Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul
70
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our increased awareness of wrongful verdicts rendered by well-intentioned
juries, it would seem decidedly counter-productive to remove from
criminal trials a charge designed to aid the jury’s appreciation of the
difficulties inherent in drawing inferences from evidence.
Each of these reasons – the purposive, the functional, and the practical
– mutually reinforce one another. In my view, the result is a clear picture
of distinct charges, with distinct lives. Hodge’s rule cannot, without loss,
be tucked within the folds of reasonable doubt. As a result, I can now link
the historical review of Hodge’s life in Canada with a principled defence
of its existence. The remaining analysis in this article will seek to
resuscitate Hodge’s Case by demonstrating the immense theoretical and
practical influence that the rule, and the reasoning that underlies it, exerts
on Canadian criminal law and evidence.
Resuscitating Hodge’s Rule
I will argue that Hodge’s rule is embedded in Canadian law much deeper
than at the level of jury instruction. The influence of the rule can be found
in two aspects of Canadian criminal evidence and procedure. First, Hodgelike thinking can be traced through the modern law of admissibility and, as
such, the rule has informed many of the evidentiary doctrines that are laid
in the hands of the trial judge. Second, in the context of criminal appeals,
it is used as a kind of yard-stick in the appellate review of the
“reasonableness” of convictions.
Both of these arguments are, in some fashion, a response to the
assertion that Cooper “removed any relevance of the distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence.”73 The claim embedded in this
statement is that direct and circumstantial evidence are now treated in
exactly the same manner, with the related implication that, at least in this
dimension of the law of evidence, Canada has moved to something akin to
a principle of the free evaluation of evidence. The arguments that follow
are tendered to emphasize that, for better or worse, nothing could be
further from the truth. Circumstantial evidence, and the attendant process
of inferential reasoning, is still treated with suspicion and care in Canadian
law, plainly demonstrating our continued commitment to an Aristotelian
privileging of and trust in direct sensory perception.
I have used the term “Hodge-like reasoning” at points in this article
and it is now necessary to clearly define what is meant. As I have
emphasized, the rule in Hodge’s Case is animated by a concern with the
moment of inference. Unlike direct evidence, circumstantial evidence
Morin: Report (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 1998). The concern
comes through most clearly in the section dealing with forensic evidence (e.g. at 312).
73 J. Sopinka et al., supra note 21 at 43.
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requires the fact finder not only to assess the credibility of the witness,
but to suppose what the implications of that evidence, if believed, might
be. Hodge-like reasoning imposes rules that seek to limit the dangers
involved in this act of inference. That is the core and spirit of the rule
in Hodge’s Case. Hodge-like reasoning denotes, then, patterns of
reasoning about evidence that reflect concern with the troublesome
moment of inference. Understood in this way, Hodge-like reasoning
actually appears in the judicially-controlled law of admissibility in two
manifestations.74
First, the law of evidence routinely seeks to use judges to limit the
range of possible inferences that a jury may draw from evidence: “One
of the most important functions of a judge is to minimize jury
inferential error so that verdicts are based on an accurate estimation of
the pertinent facts.”75 The most encompassing rule of evidence that
demonstrates this aspect of Hodge-like reasoning is the general rule of
balancing, viz., that evidence ought to be excluded if its potential for
prejudice outweighs its probative value.76 The term “potential for
prejudice” is, in that context, really code for “may lead the juror to
make an improper inference.”
A number of discrete rules of admissibility provide concrete instances
of the general inclination to guard against fact finders drawing particular
inferences. I will offer two examples.77 A statutory example is section 276
of the Criminal Code dealing with sexual violence:78
74 One might fairly note that, in the realm of admissibility, the analogy to Hodge’s
Case is incomplete. That is, whatever concern there might be with the dangers of
inferential reasoning, admissibility is distinct from reliance and once evidence is admitted,
there is no assurance – or instruction, for that matter – that the trier of fact will in fact draw
only one possible inference. In this sense, there is a functional difference between the rule
in Hodge’s Case and the examples that I discuss in this section. My point, however, is that
the core of Hodge’s rule is an attempt to limit the dangers inherent in inferential reasoning.
One can instructively trace this concern – a concern that gives rise to “Hodge-like
reasoning” – in other areas of the law of evidence.
75 V. Gold, “Jury Wobble: Judicial Tolerance of Jury Inferential Error” (1985-86) 59
S. Cal. L. Rev. 391 at 391.
76 R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562, confirms the general discretion of a trial judge
to exclude Crown offers of evidence where the probative value is outweighed by its
potential for prejudice. In R. v. Shearing, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 33, the court made clear that
where the evidence is offered by the accused, it is to be excluded only where the probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the administration of
justice.
77 In addition to the rules explored below, limitations on the uses to which flight or
other post offence conduct can be put, rules about the use of demeanour evidence, the
inadmissibility of plea negotiations and a host of other evidentiary rules could serve as
examples of this kind of reasoning.
78 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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[E]vidence that the complainant has engaged in sexual activity, whether with the
accused or with any other person, is not admissible to support an inference that, by
reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant is more likely to have
consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject matter of the charge; or; is less
worthy of belief.

Section 276(2) then lists a narrow set of exceptions to this general
exclusionary rule. It may appear that this rule is far removed from Hodge’s
Case. There is no doubt that the specific purposes are vastly different.
Nevertheless, the section 276 exclusionary rule can be thought of as a
judicialized mechanism for avoiding the dangers of inferential error
attendant upon particular kinds of evidence. Evidence of past sexual
conduct is not direct evidence of the act in question. It is a kind of
circumstantial evidence from which, in addition to a limited set of
legitimate inferences, the jury might infer that consent existed or that the
victim is not credible. Rather than leaving this matter to a charge touching
upon the dangers associated with the process of inference, section 276
removes the matter to the domain of the trial judge in the form of a
presumptive exclusionary rule rebuttable only where certain conditions
and a strict balancing test are met.79
A common law example of Hodge-like reasoning in rules of
admissibility is the rule governing the introduction of evidence of the
accused’s prior convictions. Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act
provides that any witness “may be questioned as to whether the witness
has been convicted of any offence.”80 The rationale for this rule is that
evidence of prior convictions can bear upon the question of credibility.81
In R. v. Corbett, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge has
the discretion to exclude evidence of prior convictions if the probative
value of the evidence is outweighed by its potential for prejudice.82 What
is happening here? The Corbett rule takes note of the potential that, faced
with circumstantial evidence of prior convictions, a jury might draw a
flawed inference that would put the fairness of the trial into question. The
remedy is found in a discretionary exclusionary rule whereby the judge
may withdraw the evidence from the consideration of the jury, thereby
removing any possibility that an unsound inference would be drawn.
Again, although the particularities of the rule seem to place it a
79 To admit evidence of sexual activity, section 276(2)(a-c) requires that the judge
determine that the evidence “is of specific instances of sexual activity,” “is relevant to an
issue at trial,” and “has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by
the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.” See R. v. Darrach, [2000]
2 S.C.R. 443 at 456.
80 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
81 See Sopinka et al., supra note 21 at 951.
82 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670.
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considerable distance from the rule in Hodge’s Case, there is a
commonality of underlying concern that, in my view, qualifies the Corbett
rule as Hodge-like reasoning.
The second manifestation of Hodge-like reasoning in rules of
admissibility subtly shifts the focus from the purpose of trial judges’
evidentiary rulings to the process of their decision making. In this form,
admissibility hinges not on what the jury may do with the evidence, but on
the result of the judge’s own inferential reasoning. In this manifestation,
rather than relying on a judge’s exclusionary ruling to avoid an
apprehended danger in the jury’s potential inferences, the law of evidence
requires judges to subject their own inferences to a Hodge-like filter. That
is an even more palpable way in which Hodge’s rule can be understood as
having shifted from jury to judge. Rather than telling the jury to test their
inferences against other reasonable hypotheses, or even simply
withdrawing the evidence for fear of the inferences that a jury might draw,
here the judge does the inferential testing.
Perhaps the best example of this second manifestation of Hodge-like
reasoning is the modern Canadian treatment of similar fact evidence. The
Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Handy is the guiding case on
when evidence of prior bad acts can be admitted under the similar fact
evidence rule.83 The court recognized that kind of evidence presents a
significant risk of prejudicial reasoning because, although evidence of
similar acts can suggest that the accused was, in fact, the person who
committed this crime (the permitted “identity” inference), it is also
amenable to the dangerous reasoning that this was the sort of person likely
to have committed the crime (the impermissible character inference). In
effect, similar fact evidence walks the fine line between closely related
inferences.84 As a result, the court has established a high threshold for the
admission of similar fact evidence. Similar fact evidence is “presumptively
inadmissible.”85 In order to become admissible, “[t]he onus is on the
prosecution to satisfy the trial judge on a balance of probabilities that in the
context of the particular case the probative value of the evidence in relation
to a particular issue outweighs its potential prejudice and thereby justifies
its reception.”86 The court explained that the probative value of similar fact
evidence will outweigh its potential for prejudice where “the force of
similar circumstances defies coincidence or other innocent explanation.”87
83

[2002] 2 S.C.R. 908.
R. v. Arp, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339 at 363.
85 Handy, supra note 83 at 932.
86 Ibid. [emphasis added]. The imposition of this formal burden on the Crown was
the central revolution in Handy, which clearly raised the bar for the admission of similar
fact evidence.
87 Ibid. at 929.
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The practical result of this doctrine for the trial judge is that, before
admitting such evidence, the judge must be convinced by the Crown on a
balance of probabilities that the similar fact evidence meets the high
threshold of objective improbability of coincidence. In R. v. Scopelliti,
Justice Martin stated that similar fact evidence ought to be admitted and
put before the jury only where “the propensity is so highly distinctive or
unique as to constitute a signature.”88 Similarly, the Supreme Court has
stated that “the acts compared [must be] so unusual and strikingly similar
that their similarities cannot be attributed to coincidence.”89 As Justice
Binnie wrote for the unanimous court in Handy: “References to ‘calling
cards’ or ‘signatures’ or ‘hallmarks’ or ‘fingerprints’ similarly describe
propensity at the admissible end of the spectrum precisely because the
pattern of circumstances in which an accused is disposed to act in a certain
way are so clearly linked to the offence charged that the possibility of mere
coincidence, or mistaken identity or a mistake in the character of the act,
is so slight as to justify consideration of the similar fact evidence by the
trier of fact.”90 At this point, we can see the judge being subjected to
Hodge-like reasoning requirements. I suggest that this evidentiary law
effectively requires, as a pre-requisite to admission, the judge conclude
that he can draw no reasonable inference from the evidence other than that
the accused was the person who committed both acts.
Imagine that the judge could see a reasonable inference other than that
the accused committed both acts. Would the acts be so distinctive as to
constitute a signature? The judge would have concluded, in effect, that the
similarities between the two acts could reasonably be attributed to
coincidence. By refusing to admit the evidence, the trial judge is still
limiting the potential inferences drawn by the jury from this circumstantial
evidence. However, in contrast to the last two examples, he is doing so by
subjecting his own reasoning to Hodge-like tests to determine the matter
of admissibility. Canadian law shifts the inferential problem arising from
similar fact evidence from the jury box to the judge, and solves it by
requiring the judge to undertake Hodge-like reasoning.
The requirement that judges engage in Hodge-like reasoning also
occurs with the modern approach to hearsay evidence. In R. v. Khan91 and
R. v. Smith,92 the Supreme Court established an omnibus “principled”
88

(1981), 63 C.C.C. (2d) 481 at 496 (Ont. C.A.) [emphasis added].
R. v. C.(M.H.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 763 at 771 [emphasis added].
90 Supra note 83 at 944. The court goes on (at 944-46) to formally reject a
“conclusiveness” rule that would require that the similar fact evidence be consistent only
with a finding of guilt. As I will show, however, the focus on “signatures,” “hallmarks,”
“fingerprints” and the unlikelihood of coincidence effectively amounts to the imposition
of a Hodge-like test.
91 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531.
92 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915.
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approach to the admissibility of hearsay whereby hearsay evidence would
be admissible where necessary and reliable.93 Evidence would be deemed
“necessary” where it was the only means of proving the fact in issue.
“Reliability” was a more complicated concept: “The criterion of
‘reliability’…is a function of the circumstances under which the statement
in question was made. If a statement sought to be adduced by way of
hearsay evidence is made under circumstances which substantially negate
the possibility that the declarant was untruthful or mistaken, the hearsay
evidence may be said to be ‘reliable,’ i.e., a circumstantial guarantee of
trustworthiness is established.”94 Strong resonances with Hodge-like
reasoning can be found embedded in this test for reliability. Note that
reliability is based on an assessment of the circumstances surrounding the
utterance. The judge is put in the position of inferring truth from
circumstantial evidence. That is a task that might otherwise have been left
to a jury armed with Hodge’s rule. Yet the true shadows of Hodge’s rule are
cast by the way judges are expected to reason about the reliability of the
circumstances. Since, by definition, the declarant is not available to
explain the circumstances, the judge is left to try to preclude interpretations
of the circumstances that would suggest mistake or untruthfulness. I
suggest that is Hodge’s rule at play in the judge’s mind.
In Smith, Justice Lamer demonstrates how this process of reasoning
about reliability should look. I submit that his model evidences the
similarity between the application of the hearsay rule and the rule in
Hodge’s Case. In Smith, the Crown’s theory was that the deceased (Ms.
King) had been travelling with the accused, a drug smuggler. The accused
asked her to smuggle cocaine back into the U.S. in her body and, when Ms.
King refused, he abandoned her at a hotel. From the hotel, Ms. King then
placed two telephone calls to her mother, the first informing her that the
accused had abandoned her at the hotel, and the second to tell her that he
had not yet returned. The mother then arranged for a taxi to pick her up,
but when the taxi arrived, the driver refused the fare to Detroit because she
did not have a credit card. Ms. King was then seen leaving the cab and
going directly to a payphone, at which point she again called her mother,
telling her that the accused had returned and she no longer needed a ride.
A final call was placed shortly thereafter, stating simply that she was “on
her way.” The Crown sought to introduce into evidence all of these
93 The test also required that the evidence’s probative value outweigh its potential for

prejudice. That is, in my view, a redundancy given that this requirement applies to all
relevant evidence. See Harrer and Shearing, supra note 76. In R. v. Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R.
144, the court held that this “principled approach” now eclipsed the old categorical
exceptions to the hearsay rule, such that despite the applicability of one of the old
exceptions, the admissibility of evidence would ultimately depend on the application of the
necessary and reliable test.
94 Smith, supra note 92 at 933.

68

LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN

[Vol.84

telephone conversations, on the theory that the accused had returned,
driven her somewhere and killed her.
Justice Lamer had no difficulty admitting the first two telephone calls.
The declarant was dead, so necessity was made out, and there was nothing
to suggest that the statements made in these phone calls were unreliable.
However, he excluded the third, and critical, conversation. The reasons
illuminate the point addressed in this section. Justice Lamer could imagine
a number of reasons why this evidence might not be reliable. First, it was
entirely possible that Ms. King had been mistaken and that she had only
seen a car that looked like the accused’s. In any event, he noted that “it
does seem somewhat curious that she would make the statement ‘Larry has
come back and I no longer need a ride’ before having spoken to the
[accused] to ascertain whether he proposed to allow her to continue to
travel with him.”95 Second, in the earlier conversations, Ms. King had
vehemently resisted her mother’s suggestion that a man named “Philip”
come to pick her up. There was some evidence that Philip had previously
assaulted Ms. King, and Justice Lamer hypothesized that, faced with the
choice of lying to her mother or taking a ride with Philip, she may have
chosen the former. Finally, Justice Lamer noted that Ms. King had been
travelling under an assumed name and had been using a stolen or forged
credit card: “She was, therefore, at least capable of deceit,” and she may
have lied to conceal her activities from her mother, or simply to allay her
fears.96
I have given the facts of Smith and Justice Lamer’s reasoning at length
to demonstrate that the reliability branch of the hearsay rule requires the
judge to test the circumstantial evidence to see if it will bear not only an
inference of reliability, but alternate inferences consistent with deceit or
mistake. Justice Lamer makes abundantly clear, I suggest, that this Hodgelike reasoning is precisely what is required by the reliability test:
I wish to emphasize that I do not advance these alternative hypotheses as accurate
reconstructions of what occurred on the night of Ms. King’s murder. I engage in such
speculation only for the purpose of showing that the circumstances under which Ms.
King made the third telephone call to her mother were not such as to provide that
circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness that would justify the admission of its
contents by way of hearsay evidence, without the possibility of cross-examination.
Indeed, at the highest, it can only be said that hearsay evidence of the third telephone
call is equally consistent with the accuracy of Ms. King’s statements, and also with a
number of other hypotheses.97
95

Ibid. at 936.
Ibid. It is unclear why this ground for disbelief ought not to have applied to the
previous two conversations.
97 Ibid. at 936-37.
96

2005]

The Rule In Hodge’s Case

69

As with the rule in Hodge’s Case as it relates to a finding of guilt, the
multiplicity of available inferences is fatal to a finding of reliability.
Although I have divided the examples in this section into two
“manifestations” – those rules of admissibility in which the judge simply
excludes evidence for fear of what inferences the jury might draw and
those rules that require the judge to apply Hodge-like reasoning – all are
joined by a common theme. I have argued that rape-shield rules, the law of
prior convictions, similar fact evidence and the modern approach to
hearsay can all be viewed as instantiations of the same attitude that
informed the rule in Hodge’s Case – that the need for inferential reasoning
makes circumstantial evidence somehow more “dangerous” than direct
evidence. Thus, even if it were true that the formal rule in Hodge’s Case
were dead in Canada, as it is in England and the United States, the spirit of
Hodge’s Case survives in the body of judicially-enforced rules of evidence.
I now turn to the relevance of the rule at the appellate level. Not only
does Hodge-like reasoning presently operate at the appellate level, recent
developments in the law of appellate review suggest a strong basis for
appellate judges to increase their use of the principles found in Hodge’s
Case.
The Criminal Code provides that a court of appeal may allow an
appeal against conviction where it is of the opinion that “the verdict should
be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported by
the evidence.”98 The power lies in appeals from convictions only. The
Supreme Court made clear in R. v. Biniaris that acquittals cannot be
appealed “on the sole basis that it is unreasonable, without asserting any
other error of law leading to it.”99 If an appellate court concludes that a
conviction is unreasonable, the court is then required to quash the
conviction and direct that a judgment or verdict of acquittal be entered.100
The obvious question is what criteria may an appellate court apply in
making this finding of unreasonableness. In R. v. Corbett, the Supreme
Court held that “[t]he function of the court is not to substitute itself for the
jury, but to decide whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury
acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered.”101 In so doing, the
court is entitled “to review, analyse and, within the limits of appellate
98

Section 686(1)(a)(i).
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 381 at 402.
100 Although section 686(2) states that an appellate court may direct an acquittal or
order a new trial, in R. v. Morrissey (1995), 97 C.C.C. (3d) 193 at 219 (Ont. C.A.), the court
makes clear that where a verdict is unreasonable, an acquittal should be the result. If no
reasonable trier of fact could convict on the evidence adduced, it would be unfair to
order a new trial, thereby giving the Crown a second opportunity to present better evidence.
101 [1975] 2 S.C.R. 275 at 282. This test was confirmed in R. v. Yebes, [1987] 2 S.C.R.
168.
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disadvantage, weigh the evidence.”102 Although cast in terms of a jury
trial, these powers lie equally from a verdict rendered by a judge sitting
alone and one rendered by a jury.103
When appellate judges undertake the task of reviewing the
reasonableness of a verdict, they are placed within earshot of the sirens’
call to assume the role of the trial judge or jury. Appellate judges must find
a means of expressing the unreasonableness of the conviction beyond
merely “a vague unease, or a lingering or lurking doubt based on [their]
own review of the evidence.”104 In the case of the review of a trial judge’s
verdict, the process is made somewhat easier by virtue of the fact that
judges give reasons for their decisions. In such cases, the Supreme Court
has made clear “that in trials by judge alone, the court of appeal often can
and should identify the defects in the analysis that led the trier of fact to an
unreasonable conclusion. The court of appeal will therefore be justified to
intervene and set aside a verdict as unreasonable when the reasons of the
trial judge reveal that he or she was not alive to an applicable legal
principle, or entered a verdict inconsistent with the factual conclusions
reached.”105 Where the conviction is rendered by a jury, the process is
significantly complicated by the absence of reasons. Since the correctness
of the judge’s instructions on the law must be presumed for this analysis,
the appellate court must conclude, without the benefit of reasons for
judgment, that the jury “was not acting judicially.”106 Justice Arbour
explained:
This conclusion does not imply an impeachment of the integrity of the jury. It may be
that the jury reached its verdict pursuant to an analytical flaw similar to the errors
occasionally incurred in the analysis of trial judges and revealed in their reasons for
judgment. Such error would of course not be apparent on the face of the verdict by a
jury. But the unreasonableness itself of the verdict would be apparent to the legally
trained reviewer when, in all the circumstances of a given case, judicial fact-finding
precludes the conclusion reached by the jury….[A]fter the jury has been adequately
charged as to the applicable law, and warned, if necessary, about drawing possibly
unwarranted conclusions, it remains that in some cases, the totality of the evidence
and the peculiar factual circumstances of a given case will lead an experienced jurist
to conclude that the fact-finding exercise applied at trial was flawed in light of the
unreasonable result that it produced.107
102

Biniaris, supra note 99 at 405.
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from an historical standpoint, a momentous change in the structure of adjudication.
Somewhat oddly, the historical development of this power does not appear to have been
the subject of academic commentary.
104 Biniaris, supra note 99 at 407.
105 Ibid. at 406-407.
106 Ibid. at 408.
107 Ibid. at 408-409.
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In either circumstance, however, the law “requires that the reviewing court
articulate as explicitly and as precisely as possible the grounds for its
intervention.”108 Without usurping the role of the trial judge or jury, and
not being permitted to rely upon a lingering or lurking discomfort with the
result, the appellate court must weigh the evidence, look to the verdict (and
reasons, if they exist) and then produce an explanation for why the
conviction is unreasonable. That is a substantial challenge for appellate
judges.
It is at this point that Hodge’s Case offers obvious and substantial
assistance where convictions turn on circumstantial evidence. It must be
remembered that in Cooper, even Justice Laskin did not reject the truth of
the assertion in Hodge’s Case.109 The most that any court has held,
including the House of Lords and the U.S. Supreme Court, is that the rule
in Hodge’s Case is unnecessary or redundant – not that it is incorrect. It
remains a rule of law that, where proof of a constituent element of an
offence turns on circumstantial evidence, the evidence must be not only
consistent with the guilt of the accused, but inconsistent with all other
reasonable interpretations. I would argue that the rule in Hodge’s Case is a
powerful resource for appellate judges called upon to decide cases where
unreasonable convictions are alleged.
When a case turns on circumstantial evidence, Canadian appellate
courts can set out this evidentiary matrix and test the inferences that the
evidence can bear. When there is a reasonable inference that is inconsistent
with the guilt of the accused, appellate courts have a legal rule at their
disposal to explain why, viewed “through the lens of judicial experience,”
the verdict is, as a matter of law, unreasonable.110 Since this mode of
appellate reasoning is dependent upon the evidence adduced rather than
the reasons offered by the finder of fact, Hodge’s rule is an effective
instrument for cases heard both by judge and jury and by judge alone. The
rule in Hodge’s Case can serve as a kind of inferential litmus test to be
applied by appellate courts to the evidence adduced at trial. Using Hodge’s
rule in this way, appellate judges are not just substituting their view of the
evidence for that of the finder of fact. Rather, they are applying an
evidentiary rule to determine, as a matter of law, whether the verdict is
unreasonable.
In fact, some appellate courts have used the rule in Hodge’s Case in
precisely this manner. In R. v. Liu, the Alberta Court of Appeal instructed
itself as to the test from Corbett/Yebes for determining whether a
conviction is unreasonable.111 The court then noted that all of the evidence
108
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against the accused was circumstantial. Justice Harradence concluded that
the trial judge had erred by convicting in the presence of reasonable
inferences inconsistent with the guilt of the accused. Although an inference
could be made consistent with the guilt of the accused, “other inferences
[were] consistent with the innocence of the Appellant” and, as a result, the
verdict was an unreasonable one.112
In R. v. Keysaywaysemat, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal took the
(by now familiar) view that Cooper had done away with the rule in
Hodge’s Case.113 It nevertheless felt that the rule still had utility at the
appellate level: “[T]he rule in Hodge’s Case remains a useful test in
determining the reasonableness of a jury’s verdict.”114 In that case, though
the court held that the verdict was not an unreasonable one, the court’s
reasoning is demonstrative of the point that I have argued: “This analysis
of the evidence indicates a strong circumstantial case, supported by some
direct inculpatory evidence against the appellant. The evidence, however,
to meet the rule in Hodge’s Case, should also be inconsistent with any
other rational conclusion. And, as already noted, the appellant did not have
the exclusive opportunity to commit the crime.”115 However, reviewing
the totality of the evidence bearing upon identity, the court rejected the
accused’s contention that the circumstantial evidence could bear the
inference that someone other than the accused had committed the offence:
Given all this, it is pure speculation to suggest that some unknown intruder entered the
house which contained five people and managed to sexually assault and kill the victim,
and then to leave, unnoticed by anyone in the house, and without leaving any trace of
his presence. It was reasonable for the jury to reject such a hypothesis as unfounded in
any evidence and totally speculative. It was reasonable for the jury to find that the
hypothesis was not a rational inference capable of raising a reasonable doubt.116

Although the court did not quash the conviction, its approach to the
evidence shows the utility of Hodge’s rule at the appellate level.117
These cases show that some appellate courts have seized upon the rule
in Hodge’s Case as a means of expressing the unreasonable nature of a
conviction. Further, I suggest that, owing to a recent jurisprudential
112 Ibid. at 74. See also R. v. S.L.R., [2003] A.J. 566 (C.A.); R. v. Cardinal (1990), 106
A.R. 91 (C.A); R. v. Vallieres (1973), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 241 (Que. C.A.).
113 (1992), 97 Sask. R. 66 (C.A.).
114 Ibid. at 71.
115 Ibid. at 73.
116 Ibid. at 74.
117 See also R. v. Pinsent (2000), 34 C.R. (5th) 61 at 73 (Nfld. C.A.), where Justice
Marshall uses Hodge’s rule in precisely this fashion. He stated that the rule is a “logical
substantive means of testing” the evidence adduced at trial and, in this respect, “the rule in
Hodge’s Case is not extinct.”
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development, Hodge’s rule will become an increasingly useful tool in
criminal appeals. In R. v. Sheppard, Justice Binnie held that trial judges had
a legal duty to give reasons, satisfaction of which was to be tested on a
“functional basis.”118 Most critical for the purposes of this article, Justice
Binnie emphasized a trial judge’s obligation to provide reasons sufficient
“to preserve and enhance meaningful appellate review of the correctness
of the decision.”119 In order to properly assess the reasonableness of the
decision on appeal, appellate judges need to know what inferences trial
judges are drawing from circumstantial evidence. As trial judges begin to
conform to Justice Binnie’s instruction, the result will be an increasingly
clear appellate appreciation of the inferences relied upon by judges given
the circumstantial facts before them. Consequently, as Sheppard takes root
in the Canadian judicial system, one might reasonably expect that the
appellate use of the Hodge’s Case “litmus-test” will prove more and more
prevalent in criminal appeals based upon unreasonable verdicts.
If the foregoing is true – if Hodge’s rule has become increasingly
germane to appeals based on “unreasonable verdicts” – then, even if dead
in the jury box, the rule is assured a new and vibrant life, raised up to the
plane of appellate review.
Conclusion
The purpose of this discussion has been twofold. On one level, I have
been concerned with the life of a particular evidentiary rule, tracing its
history, considering the bases for its existence and suggesting ways in
which it (or its spirit) appears in various aspects of Canadian evidentiary
and procedural law. I have argued that, contrary to the view of some
courts and commentators, the rule in Hodge’s Case still has mandatory
force in Canada. The rule is not simply a redundant articulation of the
burden of proof. Rather, it serves to address the distinct risks associated
with circumstantial evidence. I have also argued that the premises and
reasoning processes underlying Hodge’s rule can now be found in
various aspects of judicially controlled rules of evidence and the criminal
appellate process.
This analysis can also be understood as having used the life of a very
discrete and, perhaps to some, eccentric rule to draw into high relief the
extent to which particular epistemological assumptions suffuse Canadian
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when forced to submit to trial by jury, the accused is deprived of a meaningful right of
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evidence law. I began this article with a consideration of the divergent
trends in continental and common law approaches to evidence around the
turn of the eighteenth century. In response to philosophical criticisms by
enlightenment thinkers and political criticisms made by revolutionary
leaders, the continental system, which had developed a rather rigid
hierarchy of the presumptive value of evidence, rejected this a priori
assessment of evidence in favour of a “principle of free evaluation of the
evidence.” At the same time, the common law system of evidence was
just crystallizing, and in a form that would embrace the Aristotelian
valuation of sensory perception over inferential reasoning. It is out of this
movement that Hodge’s Case emerged, a case where this prioritization
formed the principled foundation for the rule that it spawned.
Accordingly, this analysis was understood as an exploration of one way
in which the Canadian law of evidence is thoroughly embedded in this
epistemological milieu. As I have shown, even apart from the rule of jury
instruction in Hodge’s Case, the law of evidence and the process of
appellate review currently presuppose the view that, in a decontextualized manner, we can evaluate what forms of proof are “better”
and “worse” – “trustworthy” or “dangerous.”
Implicit in the way I have framed this discussion is the notion that
our approach to the law of evidence is not a necessary one. Continental
systems have successfully rejected it, and there are even strands of
thought in the common law that would seem to question the wisdom of
this kind of a priori evaluation. The growing suspicion with which
eyewitness identifications (and, in particular, dock-identifications) are
regarded and the common law’s increasing concern with the testimony of
accomplices or “unsavoury characters” are two examples. Perhaps, some
two centuries after the hierarchical approach to evidence was discarded
on the Continent, the seeds of a change in the common law have been
planted. In the meantime, Hodge’s rule, in both its classic form and in the
way that it resonates with approaches to inferential reasoning throughout
the law, is still with us. For better or for worse, so too is the epistemology
upon which it is founded.

